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The image that the German public have of Poland and the Polish people is much less 
crystallized than the image of Germany in Poland. When the Germans are asked questions 
about Poland they respond ambivalently or do not have an opinion at all, much more often so, 
than when Poles talk about Germany. Almost 20% of Germans do not have any associations 
with our country. And when some associations are listed, the negative ones clearly prevail. 
 
However, some positive changes can be noted. An ISP survey carried out six years ago in 
2000, indicated that Poland was perceived as a remote and backward country. That aspect of 
the image, even though still significant, is now becoming less important. We are now, to a 
lesser extent, looked at from the point of view of our backwardness. The percentage of 
respondents describing Poles as backward has fallen from 44 to 32%. Similarly, the Germans 
more often point out that Poles are hardworking or highlight the economic development in 
Poland. The awareness of the changes that have been taking place in Poland since 1989 has 
been slowly growing among the German people. So far the German public pointed rather to 
the distance in the level of civilisation rather than to the dynamics of change in Poland. Now 
we can venture to say that the changes have been slowly becoming a part of the image of 
Poland. Such a belated positive reaction to the economic and political transformation of the 
1990s may have been triggered, among other factors, by the Polish accession to the EU in 
May 2004. Poles have not only started to participate in EU policies but they also, 
symbolically, have crossed the border to the West – they “have joined the club”, which – in 
spite of all the concerns shared by the Germans and related to issues such as labour market 
situation – may create favourable conditions for rejecting the stereotype of a “backward 
outsider”. However, we still have a long way to go before the stereotype is deeply changed 
and before we successfully overcome the negative images. Maybe that way should lead to 
increasing the interest of the German public in Poland and, in particular, encouraging them to 
visit our country. The surveys indicate that the people who have visited Poland after 1989 
(30% of the adult Germans) have a more positive perception of Poland and the Poles.  
 
 
The public opinion survey conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs is a part of the project 
„The Mutual Perception of Germans and Poles as members of the European Union” with 
support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, the Bosch-Foundation, the Foundation for 
Polish-German Cooperation, and under the patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
fieldwork was conducted by the TNS-Emnid between 29
th
 April and 7
th
 Mai 2006 with the 
representative sample n=1009 persons over 14 years old.  
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Germans’ contacts with Poland 
 
 
Almost every fourth German has never had any contact with Poland. 23% of respondents 
not only have never been in Poland and do not know any Poles, but neither have they had any 
indirect contact with Poland, for example by reading articles about Poland in the press or 
watching programs about Poland on television. Compared to the study conducted in 2000, 
there is a higher percentage of respondents declaring that they have been in Poland at least 
once in their life (35%). That growth is most visible among residents of the Länder bordering 
on Poland. Germans continue to draw information about Poland primarily from the media – 
press and television.  
 
 
Fig. Contacts with Poland, sources of knowledge about Poland (in %). 
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After the fall of communism, nearly 30% of Germans came to Poland at least once. 
Therefore, there is a certain symmetry in visits to the neighbouring country. Indeed, also 30% 
of adult Poles declare to have visited Germany after the fall of communism. Those Germans 
who were in Poland after 1989 make up the respondent group with direct knowledge of 
present-day Poland. In addition, that group maintains other types of contacts with Poland 
more frequently. These individuals much more frequently than other respondents sought out 
information about Poland in the media, read Polish books and watched Polish films.  
 
Visits to Poland depend on the region of residence. Germans who live near the Polish 
border
1
 declare to have visited Poland much more often. More than 80% have been to 
Poland at least once. However, it can be assumed that the purpose of these visits is 
                                                 
1
  Brandenburg, Mecklenburg West-Vorpomerania, Saxony and the City of Berlin. Residents of these Länder 
make up 16% of the sample (N=159). 
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commercial rather than one focused on establishing contacts with Poles or learning about their 
country. Indeed, inhabitants of borderline areas do not have Polish acquaintances any more 
frequently and read about Poland in the press or watch TV programs about it even less than 
residents of other German regions.  
 
A direct contact promotes (next to education) a more positive perception of Poles, a 
friendlier attitude toward them and increased acceptance in various walks of everyday 
life. A better image of Poles and Poland is had by university graduates and those Germans 
who have visited Poland after the fall of communism. Inhabitants of the Länder bordering on 
Poland are among them. On the other hand, a poorer image of Poland is had by those to 
whom the only or primary contact with their neighbours East of the border is provided 
by the media. 
 
 
Negative associations about Poland prevail 
 
 
A large part of German respondents (18%) has no association with their eastern 
neighbour at all and that has not changed in the past six years. To compare, practically all 
Polish respondents had some association with Germans and most often they were even able to 
provide several examples. Among German respondents, a majority (47%) provided only a 
single association. What is more, these associations are rather scattered.  
 
Negative associations dominate (41%) over positive ones (30%). The most often evoked 
association that Germans have with Poland is crime (14%, this has not changed much since 
2000), in particular car theft. Subsequent associations are also negative (41% of respondents 
cited negative issues such as illegal work, taking away jobs from Germans, poverty, 
backwardness, unemployment, poor economy, unqualified labour force and World War II). 
They prevail over positive associations such as low prices, shopping, rapid development, 
economic growth, EU membership, European partner, pretty landscape, holidays, culture, rich 
history, Polish cuisine, diligence, good workers, friendliness, hospitality. The strength of 
negative stereotyping of Poland by Germans is confirmed by their initial spontaneous 
association  that is more often negative than positive. 
 
Associations with a cheap labour force, which in 2000 were practically absent, are 
becoming stronger. Their appearance must be linked not only to the actual presence of Poles 
on the German labour market but also to the debate on the enlargement of the European 
Union. Among respondents opposed to the enlargement, associations with the labour 
market as well as crime appear more often: crime – 19%, illegal work, taking jobs away - 
16%). Associations with the labour market also depend on the education level. They dominate 
among respondents with elementary and secondary education. However, labour market and 
labour force issues can be also grounds to either neutral or downright positive associations, as 
in the case of citing Poles’ diligence. 
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Table 1. Germans’ associations with Poland (in %) 
 
Association group Associations and percentages 
(car) theft, crime (14) 
low prices, shopping, cheap to visit (8) 
cheap labour force (12), Poles helping with asparagus harvest (3) 
Everyday life 
(including work) 
illegal workers, taking jobs from Germans (10) 
poverty, backwardness (9) 
agriculture (2) 
quickly developing country (economic growth), trade contacts (4) 
unemployment (1) 
Situation in Poland 
poor economy, unqualified workers (2) 
neighbour to the east, abroad, large country (12) Mutual relations and 
politics 
EU member, European partner (4) 
former German territory (1) 
World War II, former enemy, deportations (5) 
(former) eastern block, Warsaw Pact (2) 
Wałęsa, Solidarity, breakthrough in 1989 (2) 
History 
persecutions of Jews (0.5) 
pretty landscapes, holidays, Baltic Sea (8) 
cities (Warsaw, Krakow, Gdansk) (2) 
culture, rich history (1) 
Tourism, culture 
Polish cuisine, vodka (2) 
Catholicism (2) Religion 
pope, John Paul II (5) 
family ties, former motherland (5) Personal contacts 
acquaintances, relatives (2) 
diligence, good workers (3) Human traits 
friendliness, hospitality (3) 
Other sport, World Football Championship (adversary in the same group) (1) 
Figures in the table refer to the percentage of respondents stating the given association. Respondents could state 
several associations so, consequently, percentages do not add up to 100%. Source: IPA data. 
 
 
The media play a role in shaping a negative perception of Poland. People who have 
contact with Poland primarily through the media (without any other type of contact) 
more often associate Poland with theft and illegal work. That group has more or less the 
same percentage of associations about Poland as remaining respondents, but its associations 
are more often negative. It also puts more stress than other respondents on differences 
between Poles and Germans. Even though the conviction of the dissimilarity between Poles 
and German is characteristic to the entire sample, people who have contact with Poland 
primarily through the media put more accent on it.  
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Fig. Associations by Germans whose knowledge about Poland comes primarily from the 
media (in %) 
 
Source: IPA data 
 
University graduates and inhabitants of the Länder that border on Poland more often 
associate Poland with positive traits. Among university graduates, primary associations are: 
holidays, pretty landscapes, neighbourly country and pleasant people (11%). Negative 
associations appear in this group much more seldom than among people without secondary 
education who associate Poland more with cheap labour force and stealing German jobs. In 
turn, Germans originating from the Länder neighbouring on Poland associate that 
country primarily with low prices and good shopping (20%), and then holidays and 
beautiful landscapes (14%). They less often perceive Poles as criminals (9%) and those who 
steal German jobs and work illegally (9%). It must be added that associations in other Länder 
of the former German Democratic Republic, those distanced from Poland, are among most 
negative. Consequently, contacts within the border zone seem to lead to burying old 
prejudices originating mainly in communist German propaganda.  
 
 
Poles are less backward and more diligent at work  
Spontaneous associations about Poland are, therefore, mostly negative, although they contain 
elements, or signals, of positive changes. Those positive changes are starting to be more 
visible in responses to closed questions concerning the image of a typical Pole and the image 
of Poland. German perceive their neighbours across the Oder River somewhat more positively 
than six years ago. Most progress has taken place in the assessment of those elements of 
Poland’s image that is associated with the economy, economic growth and diligence at work. 
A drop in the percentage of all negative assessments is also noteworthy.  
 
In a German person’s eyes, a typical Pole is first and foremost religious (68%). This trait is 
indicated most often, although by 5% less often than in 2000. The 5% drop may support the 
thesis that “Poland’s image is being updated” and go hand in hand with the drop in indications 
about Poles’ backwardness. Indeed, for Germans who express their opinions about Poles, 
religiosity is not completely a neutral trait reduced to a strictly religious dimension. In the 
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German culture there exists a rather widespread opinion that Catholicism is an obstacle to 
modernization. Another indicated Polish trait, much less present than religiosity but 
appreciated to a greater degree than in the preceding study, is work diligence (38%). In 2000, 
that characteristic was listed only in the fourth place (a clear 8% rise).   
 
 
Fig. The typical Pole – positive traits (codes 1 and 2 – decisive or qualified agreement 
with suggested statement (in %). 
 
 
Source: IPA data 
 
The positive trend is also signalled by an analysis of negative characteristics ascribed by 
Germans to Poles. Poles continue to be perceived as rather backward and dishonest. Currently 
these characteristics are the only ones for whom the percentage of negative responses exceeds 
positive (therefore, Germans are more inclined to speak about Poles as dishonest rather than 
honest), which additionally underlines their negative force. However, positive changes have 
indeed taken place. Only one third of German respondents points at Poles’ dishonesty and 
backwardness (yes, unfortunately we cannot help but be happy with that one third…). The 
drop in negative assessments is significant: 13% with respect to backwardness and 7% with 
respect to dishonesty.  
 
The feature that sticks out as concerns changes in the perception of the stereotypical Pole is 
the overall drop in the rate of indications of negative characteristics. While in the case of 
positive characteristics discussed above changes happened in different areas, in the case of 
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than in the previous study. This can be interpreted as a shift toward an “improved” stereotype 
of the Pole or as a “moment of hesitation” also exemplified by the growing percentage of 
ambivalent responses. Indeed, every second German has no opinion about the typical Pole 
and the image of Poland, or has purposefully chosen mid-scale responses. Ambivalent 
responses were given more often than in 2000. At that time, mid-scale responses to questions 
about Poland and the typical Pole averaged 41-43%,  in this study - 47-48%.  
 
Fig. The typical Pole – negative traits (codes 4 and 5 – decisive or qualified agreement 
with suggested statement (in %) 
 
 
Source: IPA data 
 
 
Appreciated Polish economy  
 
Changes in the perception Germans have of the typical Pole are consistent with changes in 
their perception of Poland. Poland continues to be perceived primarily as a country strongly 
influenced by the Catholic Church, but by fewer respondents than in 2000 (down from 65% to 
59%). The same goes for the perception of the typical Pole’s religiosity.  
 
Positive changes are taking place in the perception of Polish economy. It can be said that after 
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36% of German respondents - 15% more than in 2000. Germans also increasingly often 
confirm other positive statements about Polish economy (although these agreements are still 
relatively few): every fifth respondent believes that Poland has a market economy. As in the 
question about the existence of parliamentary democracy, the perception of Poland continues 
to be negative but positive changes have taken place since 2000.  
 
 
 
Fig. Perception of Poland (codes 1 and 2 – decisive or qualified agreement with 
suggested statement (in %). 
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Indeed, in 2000, more than one half of polled Germans leaned toward the opinion that 
market economy did not operate in Poland! Today this opinion is much less frequent 
although, sorry to say, it is still present (29%). Next to the persistently strong conviction 
about the absence of democratic and free-market institutions in Poland, very telling is the 
conviction of 25% of respondents about the lack of respect for national and ethnic minorities. 
Nevertheless, respondents in Germany perceive Poland’s progress in this area as well, as 
evidenced, for example, in differences between their assessment of Poland and Russia.   
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Fig. Assessment of Poland vs. assessment of Russia (“definitely agree” and “agree” 
responses in %). 
 
16 
15 
11 
11 
38 
21 
24 
29 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
                Civil liberties are respected 
       Functioning market economy 
 
 National/ethnic minority rights are respected 
 
Functioning democratic system 
Russia Poland 
 
Source: IPA data 
Sympathy, sense of kinship, acceptance of Poles 
 
All in all, Germans feel sympathy for Poles, although their majority is not able to specify their 
feelings. The proportion of respondents sympathetic to Poles is quite significant: antipathy is 
felt by 15% of German respondents, sympathy – by 26%. However, compared to 2000, the 
level of sympathy has slightly dropped. The percentage of the undecided is noteworthy – 
almost two thirds of Germans were not able to specify why they felt sympathy toward 
Poles.  
 
More sympathy toward Poles is felt by residents of the old West German Länder (29%) 
who were in Poland after 1989 (35%), and by better educated respondents. Antipathies 
subside proportionally to direct contacts with Poland and higher education.  
 
Fig. Level of Germans’ sympathy toward Poles (in %) 
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Source: IPA data 
 
 10 
 
Acceptance of Poles in everyday and political life 
 
The acceptance of various roles played by Poles in Germany’s everyday, professional 
and social life has slightly grown in the past few years.
2
. Most noteworthy is the higher 
acceptance of Poles in the dimension of the political commonwealth. Germans today are more 
inclined than six years ago to grant a citizenship to a Pole (growth by 10%) and accept his/her 
presence on the city council (growth by 9%), even though respondents accept this domain of 
Polish presence in Germany the least. The growth of the sense of acceptance is also confirmed 
by the fact that no other form of contact has met with more objection than acceptance (as was 
the case in 2000). As concerns Poles’ work in Germany, it is noteworthy that Poles are 
accepted as co-workers (85% - no change), but less willingly as superiors (approx. 60%). In 
general terms, relations bearing the features of subordination are much less acceptable.  
 
Fig. Levels of distance felt by Germans toward Poles – the table shows acceptance 
percentages; negative responses make up the difference to 100%. 
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Most accepting of Poles are residents of the Länder bordering on Poland (the acceptance 
index is even higher here than in the case of the western Länder, although the difference is 
only slight). Whereas the lowest level of acceptance is found in other eastern Länder. We 
dealt with a very similar situation in the case of the sense of sympathy – Länder of the 
                                                 
2
 A note concerning methodology: in 2006, the catalogue of possible responses did not include the “no opinion” 
option. Consequently, to provide for comparability, “no opinion” responses from the 2000 study were treated 
here as no data. This, however, can have a negative effect on the interpretation of study results since the number 
of “no opinion” responses was quite high in 2000 – up to 24% in the case of the acceptance of a Pole as the 
spouse of the respondent’s child.  
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former GDR which border on Poland show a higher level of sympathy than those that do not 
border on Poland – and in the case of the sense of kinship. This may indicate a turn-about in 
the historically shaped antipathy for Poles in the eastern Länder. Traditionally, Poland met 
with more antipathy in the Länder of the former GDR than in West Germany.  
 
Assessment of the EU enlargement and Poland’s role in Europe 
 
The assessment of Poland is associated with the wider assessment of the EU enlargement and 
its consequences. Many Germans (43%) have a rather critical opinion of the latest 
enlargement, whereas only a few percent less (40%) are inclined toward its positive 
assessment. A decisive majority of respondents (64%) considers that the enlargement 
benefited primarily the new members. A positive attitude is indicated by respondents who 
feel more sympathy toward Poland, feel a greater kinship with Poles and are more 
inclined to accept them in everyday and political life. Such attitude is promoted by better 
education. Among respondents who visited Poland after 1989 (49% of positive responses) and 
those who reside in regions bordering on Poland (40%), positive responses exceed negative. 
The attitude toward Poland is more positive among CDU supporters (44%) than among those 
who support SPD (41%), but both are far behind the enthusiasm shown for Poland by 
respondents who support the Green Party (62%).  
 
The IPA study conducted in 2000 showed that for 60% of Germans the European Union was 
firstly an economic community and only then a political one. The outcome of the present 
study also indicates the supremacy of economic arguments in Germans’ opinions. Higher 
expenditures suffered by “old” EU members as a result of the enlargement and its negative 
effect on the German labour market are mentioned much more often than arguments 
associated with politics or functioning of the EU.  
 
Fig. Main consequences of the EU enlargement (no more than two selections were 
allowed).  
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Respondents with a positive attitude toward the EU enlargement focus first and foremost on 
the higher security and stability in Europe (47%), and a larger market for German products 
(38%). Whereas respondents critical of the enlargement concentrate on its negative 
consequences: higher unemployment in Germany and worse situation of German workers  
(66%), higher financial burdens imposed on “old” EU members (60%), deteriorated quality of 
EU functioning (28%). Similarly, respondents who point at new EU member states as main 
beneficiaries of the enlargement see mainly its negative effects: a higher cost burden to “old” 
member states (52%), growth of unemployment in Germany and deteriorated condition of 
German workers (51%), deteriorated functioning of the European Union (20%). A much more 
positive outlook at the enlargement is shown by respondents who consider that both “old” and 
“new” EU member states benefit from it: higher security and stability in Europe (45%), a 
larger market for German products (41%), a greater role played by the EU in the world (29%). 
 
How is Poland’s European Union policy seen against this background? Germans are quite 
ambiguous about it. Respondent groups of roughly the same size are inclined to opposite 
opinions – positive and negative – about Poland’s European policy.  
 
 
Fig. Assessment of Poland’s EU policy  
 
 
28 34 38 
40 24 37 
35 27 38 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
   Tends to contribute to exacerbating  
disputes and tension in Europe 
 Aims at achieving own interests at the 
     expense of other countries 
 Slows down European integration 
I agree Hard to say Contrary opinion 
 
Source: IPA data 
 
However, it must be stressed that these questions are difficult and respondents had a hard time 
answering them. More than one third of respondents had no opinion about Poland’s attitude 
toward further European integration. Whereas among those who had an opinion, most tended 
to consider that Poland acted in favour of a deeper integration (38% against, 28% who had a 
contrary opinion). 
 
Germans are more inclined to say that in the most important directions of European 
integration that can count on Poland’s support. That opinion was stated by approximately 
50% of respondents.  
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Fig. Issues concerning EU policies and development in which Germans can count on 
Poland’s support (in %) 
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Poland - its policy toward Russia and trans-Atlantic relations 
 
In the eastern policy dimension which is important for Poles, Germans place cooperation with 
Russia ahead of cooperation with the Poland. According to the respondents, German 
interests benefit more from cooperation with Russia (25%) than with Poland (9%). More 
than one half of respondents considers that cooperation with both countries is equally 
important for Germany (53%). The majority opinion is also that, in its cooperation with 
Russia, Germany ought to take into consideration the interests and opinions of Poland more 
than it has done thus far (45%, although only 7% responded with “decidedly yes”). A contrary 
opinion is indicated by 38% of respondents, and 12% is “decidedly” against consulting 
Poland.  
 
Would it be that one of the reasons for a rather sceptical approach to consulting Poland lies in 
the German conviction of Poland’s overly close alliance with the United States? Probably not. 
There is no dominant conviction in the German society that relations with the US are more 
important for Poland than its relations with the EU and its members. 17% of respondents 
consider that the United States are more important for Poland, 20% that the European Union 
is more important.  
 
 
Polish/German relations 
 
Socio-demographic variables in the German society do not affect German opinions about 
Polish/German relations. Their assessment is not affected by respondents’ age or education, 
residence in the Länder bordering on Poland or visit in Poland after 1989. Germans who 
sympathise with Poland have a more positive opinion of bilateral relations.  
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Fig. Assessment of Polish/German relations (in %) 
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Respondents who see Polish/German relations as poor (28%, n=270) believe it to be 
primarily an effect of conflicting Polish and German interests (34%). This stands in 
contrast to the opinion expressed by Poles, who believe that they are mainly a result of a 
difficult common history (43% of responses, other 2 responses - 26-29%). This difference 
of opinion points to a dissimilar attitude of both nations to the impact of history on mutual 
relations. 
 
One of the indicators of mutual attitudes of Poles and Germans may lie in the answer to the 
question about the possibility of reconciliation of the two nations. More than one half of 
German respondents (58%) believes such reconciliation to be possible – the same percentage 
as in 2000. What has changed is the percentage of the undecided – it has dropped by more 
than 10% and seemingly indicates that the group which considers reconciliation impossible
3
 
has grown – that group has increased almost four-fold and currently amounts to nearly 20%. 
 
Fig. Assessment of the possibility of reconciliation between Poles and Germans 
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3
 A note concerning methodology: that difference may be partly a result of the sequence of questions as they 
appear in the questionnaire. In the latest poll, the question about reconciliation followed the question about 
negative elements in mutual relations associated with the painful past, whereas in the 2000poll it followed the 
neutral open question “What do you think divides and connects Poles and Germans?” 
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Germans on the Centre Against Expulsions  
 
 
A majority of Germans (68%) has not heard about Erica Steinbach’s initiative to 
commemorate German expellees of the World War II period. 20% of respondents have heard 
about it but do not know what it is.  Only 12% have heard about it and declare that they know 
a lot about the subject. It may be assumed that some 12% to 15% of Germans have been 
interested in this issue to some degree and have an opinion about it.  
 
Fig.. Germans’ knowledge of the Centre Against Expulsions 
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The issue is particularly alive among those who believe that World War II continues to affect 
Polish/German relations. In that group, the percentage of respondents acknowledging 
familiarity with the Centre amounts to 20%. The initiative interests primarily respondents 
who are over 66 years of age (25%). Young respondents are completely disinterested (in the 
group younger than 29 years, 80% have heard nothing about the subject; in the age 30-45 
group - 74%). Among those who have heard about the Centre Against Expulsions, most 
(48%) assess Erika Steinbach’s initiative positively.  
 
It must be noted that a significant group of respondents (25%) believes that relations between 
Poland and Germany would improve if “Poland symbolically admitted that wrongs have been 
committed against Germans during and after World War II”. This percentage gives a high 
rank to the issue and may indicate that, irrespective of the familiarity with and support of 
Erika Steinbach’s initiative, Germans are slowly moving toward a stronger sense of  having 
been wronged and having also been victims of World War II. Also in the context of their 
relations with Poland and Poles.  
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Fig. Actions that in Germans’ opinion would contribute to better Polish/German 
relations now and in the future (no more than three selections were allowed) (in %). 
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* * * 
 
The public opinion poll that lies at the foundation of this study was conducted within the 
framework of the project “Poland-Germany; mutual perception on Poles and Germans in the 
face of their joint presence in the EU” in cooperation with Robert Bosch Foundation, Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation and Polish/German Cooperation Foundation under the patronage of 
the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The poll was conducted in the field by TNS-Emnid 
company between April 29
th
 and May 5
th
, 2006, on a representative sample of 1009 persons 
over the age of 14. The poll on the perception of Poles in Germany conducted in November 
2000, the results of which are often cited in this study, had been also conducted by TNS-
Emnid on a representative sample of 1000 persons over the age of 14. 
 
